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How to make EU bonds 




If the European Commission’s proposal for a €750bn recovery fund is approved by member states, the EU 
would become the biggest supranational issuer in the world. To uphold the EU’s extremely high 
creditworthiness under a massively enhanced borrowing envelope, the Commission proposes that member 
states transfer up to 0.6% of GNI to the EU budget per year until 2058, when the last bonds would be repaid. 
This amount will exceed the EU’s plausible annual debt service costs. But member states’ pledges of future 
transfers to the EU budget are effectively unenforceable promises.  
An EU break-up scenario may appear unlikely today, but so did Brexit a decade ago. A deeper political crisis 
within the EU could lead to promised payments being withheld, immediately jeopardising the EU’s timely 
debt service. If the bonds are to be rated AAA, the probability of such an adverse turn of events must be 
almost zero. It is difficult to make this assertion with confidence decades into the future. Investor doubts 
about the EU’s long-term survival, however exaggerated they might be, could lead to higher than necessary 
funding costs, which will have to be borne by European taxpayers.  
To remove all doubt, member states should provide more robust financial support. The most straightforward 
form would be unconditional guarantees with cross-default clauses (as in the cases of the EFSF or the SURE 
programme); providing the EU with a capital cushion (as in the cases of the EIB and ESM); granting the EU a 
stable and meaningful own-resource tax base, in line with the Commission recommendations, or providing 
collateral in the form of government bonds to guarantee the EU's debt service on a rolling basis.  
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1. Introduction  
If the European Commission gets its way, the EU will soon enter the capital market at the deep 
end. For the first time the EU will borrow large amounts under its own name. If approved by 
member states, the EU will raise €750 billion of unsecured bonds to finance the Next 
Generation EU recovery fund. Some €500 billion of the receipts will be used to fund grants to 
member states hit particularly hard by the pandemic. The remaining €250 billion will be on-lent 
to member states, which will be responsible for paying them back to the EU (European 
Commission, 2020a). Nevertheless, all EU members will be collectively responsible for making 
sure the EU always has sufficient resources to secure the debt service on its bond programme. 
The final contours of the recovery fund are still under discussion. A decision is possible at the 
Council summit on 17-18 July 2020. It is conceivable that the final envelope of the EU’s 
borrowing capacity will be reduced, maybe back to €500bn, which was the original proposal 
put forward by Chancellor Merkel and President Macron. It is also possible that the share of 
grants will be reduced, and more funds will be on-lent as loans rather than handed out as 
grants. This is what the Netherlands and its ‘frugal four’ allies appear to be pushing for. The 
proposed formula to distribute the funds across countries is also still to play for. 
Whatever the final agreement, one thing seems certain: the EU’s presence on the capital 
markets will surge. It is set to become the biggest multilateral issuer globally. That monumental 
shift from dwarf to giant calls for a reassessment of the factors underpinning the EU’s 
creditworthiness. With the stakes growing commensurately with the increased liabilities it is 
opportune to ask what could be done to strengthen the EU’s creditworthiness in a financially 
and politically sustainable way.  
The first section of this paper describes the EU’s so far limited exposure to capital markets. The 
second lays out the factors that have underpinned the EU’s extremely high creditworthiness 
until now, investigating whether those supporting factors will be sufficient to uphold the EU’s 
strong credit credentials under a dramatically enlarged issuance environment. The third section 
will underline why the unconditional financial support of the most highly rated member states 
is particularly critical for the EU’s own creditworthiness. The fourth and final section offers 
recommendations to make EU bonds safer and the institution a more resilient issuer.  
2. A short history of the EU in the capital market  
The EU has issued bonds ever since the mid-1970s when the Community Loans Mechanism 
(CLM) was implemented. It was introduced with a view to supporting the member countries 
most affected by the oil crisis, especially Italy (Horn, Meyer, & Trebesch, 2020). The loans were 
reimbursable by the borrowing countries and intended to alleviate balance of payments 
pressures. As such the CLM was effectively an alternative to IMF programmes. Member states 
guaranteed 200% of the credit limit (set at $3 billion in 1974). This was done to ensure that the 
CLM-bonds issued could be serviced even if the borrowing member defaulted and one or 
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several guarantors were unable or unwilling to pay up. The funds raised and on-lent to member 
states in economic distress were significant: Italy received 1.7% of its GDP between 1974 and 
1976, Ireland almost 4%. The CLM was later converted into the Balance of Payment Facility, 
which is now restricted to EU members outside the euro area (since its creation in 2012, the 
European Stability Mechanism, ESM, is now the institution of choice when lending to financially 
stressed euro area sovereigns). Under the Balance of Payments facility, the EU borrowed and 
on-lent during the financial crisis a total of €18 billion to Hungary, Latvia and Romania.  
Until now, the receipts of every single EU bond issue have been on-lent back-to-back to 
member states (and to a limited extent to non-members through the Macro-Financial 
Assistance window). All bonds have therefore been secured by the repayment obligation of the 
borrowing member state. Over 90% of the EU’s current exposure is to Portugal and Ireland. 
These loans were made in the context of the EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism), 
a €60bn facility introduced in 2010 to provide financial support to euro area governments with 
shaky or no market access. For that purpose, the EU issued €45 billion worth of bonds in 2011 
and 2012. Since then, issuance volumes have dwindled to a trickle, to average some €3 billion 
annually. The EFSM has been superseded by the creation of the ESM. As of today, the EU has 
outstanding bonds of around €50 billion. For all intents and purposes, compared to the big fish 
multilateral lending institutions, the EU has been a minnow (see Figure 1).  
If Brussels has its way, that is about to change, and in a big way. If fully implemented, the Next 
Generation recovery plan would increase the EU’s financial obligations over fifteen-fold in the 
coming years (see Figure 1). It would be a bigger debtor than the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), which until now has been the most prolific supranational issuer globally. Two-thirds of 
EU-bond receipts will fund grants. For the first time, the EU would issue liabilities that are not 
secured by back-to-back loans to member states. Instead, EU debt servicing would be backed 
by the promises of all member states to provide sufficient resources.   
Figure 1. Total assets (€ billion, 2019) 
 
Source: own calculations, based on 2019 balance sheets of issuers. 
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3. The factors supporting the EU’s creditworthiness 
Credit ratings are a common and widely understood shorthand for creditworthiness. Currently, 
as an issuer, the European Union enjoys a top-notch AAA credit rating from Moody’s, Fitch, 
DBRS and Scope. Standard & Poor’s lowered the rating in two steps (2013 and 2016) to AA, 
both times coinciding with downgrades of sovereign member states, including that of France. 
While rating approaches differ somewhat across agencies, the S&P downgrades underscore the 
fact that the EU’s own creditworthiness is ultimately tied to that of its members, especially the 
most highly rated ones. All agencies currently assign a stable outlook to their respective ratings. 
That is their way of indicating that they consider further downgrades unlikely during the next 
two to three years.  
But will this constructive view survive contact with the new reality of massively ramped up EU-
debt? Brussels thinks so. When releasing its recovery fund plan, the Commission confidently 
stated that this huge borrowing programme will be supported by its “very strong credit rating”.  
The Commission’s confidence may be well-placed: some rating agencies have already signalled 
that the EU’s rating is unlikely to change under the larger borrowing envelope. Moody’s stated 
that the recovery fund would have “limited credit impact” for the EU, as the larger debt burden 
would be offset by a commensurate increase in member state support. Moody’s also makes 
the case that the creation of the Fund would be a strong signal regarding EU cohesion, 
presumably a credit positive (Moody's, 2020). Similarly, Fitch indicated that it considers the 
comfort of additional EU-budget resources sufficient to offset the risks of higher debt service 
outlays (Fitch Ratings, 2020). Earlier, Scope Ratings, the largest Europe-based rating agency 
stressed that it uses a mandate-driven approach to assessing supranationals. Scope therefore 
believes the recovery fund to be a “critical step in the right direction”. In essence, Scope 
considers the EU AAA-rating to be resilient to a significant balance sheet increase (Scope 
Ratings, 2020).1  
The EU’s credit ratings have been underpinned by a similar set of factors at all agencies. Rating 
companies use discretion to weigh them differently; hence the split rating from S&P, for 
example. But fundamentally, they are all looking through similar lenses at the same picture. 
This section sets out the factors that have supported the EU’s rating. It also raises the question 
whether those strengths may be diluted once the EU’s ambitious plan becomes a reality. There 
have been several layers of protection safeguarding the EU’s debt service capabilities.  
Repayment of loans granted. The first line of defence for debt service has been the repayment 
by the sovereign member state to which the receipts had been on-lent. This credit support will 
be absent for the share of the EU bonds that will fund the grant component (up to €500 billion). 
The recipients of grants are by definition under no obligation to pay them back to the EU. This 
line of defence will therefore not hold in the future.  
 
1 Disclosure: the author is an Independent Non-Executive Director at Scope Ratings GmbH. This role does not 
involve any analytical work at the firm. 
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Budgetary flexibility. The EU has the flexibility to re-prioritise spending towards debt-servicing 
over all other programme expenditure. In the past this flexibility would have been used if a 
member state defaulted on its obligations to the EU. To date, no such default has ever occurred. 
Up until now the amounts on which a member state could have defaulted vis-a-vis the EU have 
been modest relative to the size of the EU budget. The average amount of existing EU debt 
maturing between 2022 and 2030 is €2.6 billion per year. This is dwarfed by the envelope of 
the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-21 of over €1 trillion. Reprioritising 
expenditure would have been sufficient under most plausible circumstance to cover the 
receipts shortfall caused by the member’s default. With average debt redemptions increasing 
tenfold post-2028, budgetary flexibility will be greatly diminished when serving as a meaningful 
defence to underpin EU debt service payments. Dependence on extraordinary member support 
will therefore become even more important. 
Own resources. The EU’s so-called own resources are somewhat of a misnomer. The largest 
part of those revenue streams are member states’ transfers based on the size of their 
economies and a share of their value-added-tax receipts. The EU ‘owns’ them insofar as 
member states have committed to making those contributions in the binding MFF agreements. 
To always ensure sufficient repayment capacity, the Commission proposes to increase the own-
resources ceiling – the maximum amount the Commission can request from member states to 
finance EU expenditure – to 2% of gross national income (GNI). Between 2028 and 2058 an 
amount equivalent to 0.6% of GNI will be reserved exclusively for the debt service of securities 
issued to finance the Recovery Fund’s operations (European Commission, 2020c). Based on an 
estimate of 2028 GDP of the EU27 of €16.3trn (25% above 2020 level), 0.6% would amount to 
almost €100 billion. Assuming an EU27 average nominal growth rate of 2.5% per year 
thereafter, this amount will roughly double to be close to €200 billion in 2058. The proposed 
regulation on the EU own resource system also includes an annual debt repayment limit of 7.5% 
of the debt (Art. 3b(2) of (European Commission, 2020b)), which translates into a maximum 
€56 billion annually. A linear amortisation schedule would result in a much lower €24 billion 
per year (still a tenfold increase from the status quo), of which €16 billion would account for 
the portion that will have funded non-reimbursable grants. Hence, under the EC proposal, the 
annual debt repayments would be comfortably covered by member states' promises of 
increased budgetary contributions in the future. 
Even so, financial indicators of the EU as an issuer would weaken compared to the status quo. 
The EU holds no equity as traditional multilateral lenders do. Equity is a buffer that protects 
creditors from deterioration in an issuer’s credit portfolio. The only other relevant institution 
without a meaningful capital cushion is the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, see Table 
1, last column, from (S&P, 2019)). However, the EFSF benefits from explicit, unconditional and 
timely guarantees. Members’ guarantees for the EFSF have a cross-default link. If the payment 
under guarantee is refused, the guarantor itself would be placed in default by rating agencies. 
That acts as a strong incentive to honour the guarantee and makes them effectively self-
enforcing. The EU does not benefit from comparably strong financial support. It can count on 
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large, but less binding future budget commitments, as described above. Not making good on 
such commitments does not constitute a member state default under prevailing default 
definitions. It would therefore be less financially damaging to the supporting government. 
The EU’s liquidity position would also weaken when its borrowing programme is rolled out. We 
can consider the so-called fiscal headroom as the EU’s main liquidity buffer. The EU budget has 
always been designed with a safety margin. The fiscal headroom is the difference between the 
own resource ceiling (the maximum amount for which member states are on the hook) and the 
expenditures appropriated in adopted budgets. The fiscal headroom can be used to ensure 
timely debt service and is akin to callable capital in multilateral lending institutions like the EIB. 
Should it become necessary (which has never happened), the EU can demand that member 
states pay up to the resource ceiling to secure debt service. In 2020 the fiscal headroom stands 
at 0.19% of GNI (European Parliament, 2020). This is equivalent to 59% of the EU’s outstanding 
debt (see Table 1, penultimate column). 
Table 1. The EU and its multilateral peers: key financial ratios 
 
 
From 2028 onwards the EU budget will, as described above, contain an earmarked annual 0.6% 
of GNI in commitments to cover service of the debt to be issued under the recovery 
programme. While this is a large increase from the current headroom, it is rising by less than 














EU 2018 Aaa AA 53 57% 0,0%
EU 2028 (0,6% of GNI headroom, current proposal) tbd tbd 872 13% 0,0%
EU 2028 (0,4% of GNI headroom, hypothetical) tbd tbd 872 9% 0,0%
EIB European Investment Bank Aaa AAA 554 22% 12,8%
IBRD World Bank (IBRD) Aaa AAA 246 36% 14,9%
ESM European Stability Mechanism Aaa N.R. 196 59% 42,4%
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility* Aa1 AA 195 5% 0,4%
ADB Asian Development Bank Aaa AAA 193 35% 26,6%
IDA World Bank (IDA) Aaa AAA 169 323% 86,4%
IADB Inter-American Development Bank Aaa AAA 119 36% 25,4%
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Aaa AAA 68 71% 26,3%
AfDB African Development Bank Aaa AAA 41 52% 21,3%
CEB Council of Europe Development Bank Aa1 AAA 3 42% 12,4%
Assumption: EU27 GDP in 2028 €13.4 tr (25% above 2020 level) and equalized with GNI.
Note: Data for all peers is for 2018 except for total assets (2019). "Liquid assets" for EU 2018 is equivalent to the difference between 
own resource ceiling and total payment appropriations. "Liquid assets" for EU 2028 is equivalent to 0,6% of EU27 GNI (as per 
Commission proposal for a Council decision on the system of Own Resources of the European Union, Article 3c), or a lower 0.4% in a 
hypothetical compromise scenario). Liquidity for peers does not include callable capital. If it did, the ratio would increase very 
significantly for most peers.
EU 2028 assumes full usage of borrowing for SURE (€100 billion) and EU Next Generation (€750 billion) and a technical assumption that 
all EU bonds maturing through 2028 (€31.5 bn) will be retired.
* EFSF debt securities are backed by several (but not jointly), irrevocable, unconditional and timely guarantees by Euro area member 
Sources: own calculations, Issuer financial reports, S&P Global "Supranationals Special Edition, Oct. 2019 for last two columns (2018 
data)
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the outstanding debt. The liquidity buffer would drop to 11% of gross debt in 2028, which is 
well below the liquidity cushions typically recorded for AAA-rated supranationals. Only the EFSF 
has a lower liquidity ratio, as it does not need much liquidity of its own: through the timely 
cross-default guarantees it can rely on drawing on the liquidity of member states themselves. 
As the debt will continuously fall through 2058 and the denominator (GNI) of the 0.6% ratio 
continues to rise, it is not implausible that member states will negotiate a lower ratio than 0.6% 
at some point in the future. Otherwise the annual earmarked amount in, say, 2038 (€125bn=6% 
of GNI of €20.8 tr) would exceed the average annual amortisation (€25bn) fivefold. That seems 
excessive by almost any measure. Renegotiation to set a lower contingent contribution in the 
future for purely political reasons is therefore a possibility. Should the proposed earmarked 
large contribution of 0.6% of GNI be reduced faster than the reduction of the outstanding debt 
it is meant to support, the liquidity position would come under additional pressure (see third 
line in table for an example of 0.4% of GNI earmarked headroom). 
4. Member states’ support promises are subject to imponderable political 
risks  
In the light of more stretched financial indicators, the ability and willingness of highly 
creditworthy member states to support the EU budget will, more than ever, be the decisive 
factor backing the EU’s own extremely high creditworthiness. In 
the EU’s case this extraordinary support is particularly important: 
the EU is the only European multilateral institution issuing debt 
that does not enjoy either a cushion of paid-in capital, or explicit 
member state guarantees. Until now, those support mechanisms 
have never been necessary. The EU’s borrowing was minor, and its 
existing financial flexibility was considered sufficient. Now its 
borrowing will become significant and financial flexibility more constrained. Without a capital 
buffer or legally enforceable guarantees, uninterrupted and unwavering AAA-member support 
will be more critical than ever. 
There is currently no reason to believe that highly rated member states would renege on any 
promises made. This constructive view is not materially tarnished by the fact that one of the 
largest net contributors, the UK, has now left the Union. Britain is believed to honour all 
financial obligations towards the EU that it has contracted during its membership (the so-called 
Brexit bill). Should other countries decide to leave the EU as well, it would be a fair assumption 
that those departing members would also stand by their legacy obligations. That includes the 
commitments that are about to be made now to support funding of the recovery programme. 
Nevertheless, through negotiations over successive EU multiyear financial frameworks (MFF) 
net contributors have a track record of pushing back hard to minimise their own obligations 
towards the Union. Three of the five remaining EU AAA-members are part of the so-called frugal 
four (the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), with Austria at AA+ being the fourth. They have 
The EU is the only European 
multilateral institution issuing 
debt that does not enjoy either a 
cushion of paid-in capital, or 
explicit member state 
guarantees. 
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been looking at the Commission proposal with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. Germany has 
shown a more constructive approach lately and the more federalist inclination recently 
displayed by Berlin seems to be supported by the German public. Luxembourg, the remaining 
AAA member, is financially insignificant. These five are the countries that matter most for the 
EU’s AAA rating. 
Lasting trust in those member states’ promises is pivotal for the pricing and rating of the 
approaching wave of EU bonds. Under the plan, paying up is an obligation under European law. 
But such obligations are effectively unenforceable. The sovereign 
is, well, sovereign. Remember Boris Johnson telling EU peers in 
2017 to “go whistle” when confronted with Britain’s obligation to 
pay the Brexit bill? Short of gunboat diplomacy, forcing a 
recalcitrant state to fulfil its promise is in practice impossible. That 
inevitably raises the question of how much store to put in commitments to add to future EU 
budgets. And since the promise to make good on funds to the EU budget do not carry a cross-
default clause, as explicit guarantees would, members can renege on them almost with 
financial impunity. Brussels might secure a favourable ruling from the European Court of 
Justice. But nothing stops a sovereign from just shrugging it off and ignoring it. 
Most observers currently think a traumatic EU-break up scenario is implausible. I would agree. 
Yet again, when Tony Blair entered 10 Downing Street and seemed to move his country closer 
to Europe, Brexit appeared equally inconceivable. Sentiments can change swiftly. An IPSOS poll 
recorded a halving of Italians’ trust in the EU between 2010 and 2017. By that time, a mere 
38% of Italian respondents held a positive view of the EU (Politi, 2017). According to Google 
Trends, the search term ‘Italexit’ spiked in Italy in the spring of this year. It has come down from 
the peaks, but is still at an elevated level, comparable to a previous peak in 2018 when some 
members of the populist government of the time were publicly toying with the idea of Italy 
leaving the euro area (Google Trends, 2020). On balance, Europe’s citizens (still) hold the EU in 
high regard. But despite their own overall positive view, they are gloomy about Europe’s future: 
a poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations in 2019 (see Figure 2) 
suggests that more than half of the citizens surveyed considered a collapse of the EU likely in 
the next one or two decades (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). This popular view 
seems unduly defeatist. Yet, Brexit, Trump and coronavirus have taught us to expect the 
unexpected. And to prepare for it better. 
Lasting trust in those member 
states’ promises is pivotal for 
the pricing and rating of the 
approaching wave of EU bonds. 
HOW TO MAKE EU BONDS A EUROPEAN SAFE(R) ASSET | 9 
 
Figure 2. Poll by European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017 
 
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations, “Seven days to save the European Union”, May 16, 2019.  
 
A situation where one or several of its large members turn their backs on the EU would be a 
huge, possibly mortal, blow to Europe’s institutional integrity. Before such a cataclysmic 
collapse of cohesion, the Union would have gradually slid into political disarray and mutual 
distrust. The economic backdrop would almost certainly be equally unfavourable. The very 
future of monetary union could be at stake. In such a fraught political environment, imagine a 
distrusted Brussels administration demanding the fulfilment of commitments made a long time 
ago. National leaders might be reluctant to subordinate immediate domestic spending 
priorities to legally unenforceable promises to the perceived benefit of an institution, from 
which electorates would by then have become increasingly alienated. If one government delays 
or refuses payment, others might follow. A dwindling band of loyalists will eventually resist 
offsetting the emerging financial shortfall. The EU would 
become an ever-loser union and its debt service could be at 
acute risk. Let us be clear: judging from the summer of 2020 
this turn of events looks highly unlikely. But where in the shades 
of grey of unlikeliness does it fall? 
If the EU bonds are to be rated and priced AAA, it is not enough 
to believe that the probability of such a default scenario is low. 
It must be extremely low. Specifically, it must be AAA-remote. This means that its occurrence 
should be as unlikely as an AAA issuer defaulting on its own debt. Moody’s data shows long-
term AAA default rates a little above 0.1% (Moody's, 2019). Investors believing that the EU will, 
If the EU bonds are to be rated 
and priced AAA, it is not enough to 
believe that the probability of such 
a default scenario is low. It must 
be extremely low. Specifically, it 
must be AAA-remote. 
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for decades to come, stick together as a cooperative club motivated by mutual solidarity with 
a 99.9% probability will happily add EU bonds to their portfolio at negative AAA-yields.  
It seems more likely, however, that EU bonds will trade at a higher yield than other AAA-rated 
issuers. Bond markets already show higher yields for the EU than for AAA-rated European 
issuers such as Germany or the EIB. The EU yield curve looks more like that of AA-rated France 
than of AAA-rated Germany. In early July, the EU traded 15 basis points wide of EIB at the 10-
year tenor and over 40 with respect to Germany. The discount may be due to the lower liquidity 
of EU bonds that come with a smaller size. The liquidity will surely increase in line with issuance 
size going forward. This could lead to spreads versus Germany and AAA supranational peers 
narrowing, other things being equal.  
But as has been described in this section, other things will be far from equal. A further widening 
of the spreads from today’s situation is therefore quite possible once the EU bond supply takes 
off. In fact, EU bonds have already begun to underperform some of their institutional peers in 
the last few weeks (European Commission, 2020d). Higher yields translate into higher costs for 
European governments, and ultimately taxpayers. Governments should therefore have every 
incentive to do whatever it takes to reduce the perceived risk and interest cost of the bonds. 
5. How to make EU bonds safer 
What can be done to underpin the credit strength of the EU as an institution? Creditworthiness 
cannot be created out of thin air. Without a reliable and sizeable resource base of its own, the 
EU’s respect with investors and rating agencies will rely on the financial support of member 
states, especially the highly rated ones.  What are the chances that in the coming decades, 
political controversies will erupt that may throw into question the EU-edifice as we now know 
it? A Brexit-squared, just more acrimonious? And will those solemn promises made during the 
then distant 2020 corona crisis still be considered good enough by investors holding the debt 
decades from now? While the bulk of the EU’s gross issuance would occur within the next few 
years, the bonds would most likely have to be refinanced between now and 2058, in line with 
the EU’s practice of rolling over debt issued in the past so as to optimise the cost of funding 
(European Union, 2010). It is therefore important that the trust in the institutional set-up of 
the EU will be maintained beyond the short term. 
George Soros looks like an unlikely buyer of EU bonds. The investment legend recently 
ruminated that the EU might “not survive the coronavirus crisis” if it cannot find a joint 
approach to assist the most-afflicted countries (Faulconbridge, 2020). That seems overdone. 
But it reflects the fact that many investors, especially outside the EU, harbour lingering doubts 
about the EU’s long-term future. A view shared by many EU citizens, as has been shown above. 
What can be done to entice Mr Soros and his fellow-sceptics to buy EU bonds at AAA-yields? 
Sweet talk about ever-closer union is unlikely to do the trick.  
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What will make a difference are tangible commitments to strengthen the credit quality of the 
bonds. To achieve this, the bonds must benefit from some credit enhancements. Luckily, the 
EU already has longstanding experience with such credit enhancements. All that is required is 
the will to apply tried and tested tools.  
Guarantees: the most straightforward way to strengthen the bonds’ credit credentials would 
be to let guarantees take the place of unenforceable promises. Sovereign guarantees have been 
the instrument of choice ever since the Community Loan Mechanism 
of the 1970s. As recently as May 2020 the EU-Council approved the 
SURE-Facility aimed at financially supporting member states in their 
fight against pandemic-related unemployment (European Council, 
2020). It was also the support mechanism chosen to underpin the 
creditworthiness of the EFSF in 2010. Unconditional and timely guarantees are stronger 
commitments because they entail cross-default clauses. Failure to fulfil the obligations under 
the guarantee count as a default of the guaranteeing member state itself. The cost of a 
sovereign default is immeasurably higher than reneging on an unenforceable promise. In the 
absence of cross default clauses, the deterrent to withhold EU budget contributions are largely 
limited to reputational consequences.  
Member states’ provision of guarantees has become ever stingier. When the Union issued the 
Community Loans in the 1970s, members guaranteed 200% of the underlying bonds. The 
securities issued by EFSF a decade ago were secured by member guarantees of up to 165% of 
the bonds’ face value (Moody's, 2020). With the SURE facility earlier this year, over-
collateralisation with guarantees turned to under-collateralisation (25% of total). The up to 
€750 billion of bonds under the EU recovery fund would enjoy no guarantees at all under the 
current plan.  
So far only a few investors have begun to question why a borrowing programme that will be 
unusually large will benefit from protections that are unusually weak. But when the next 
political crisis hits the EU, or the current sea of euro liquidity 
recedes, investors may well become more selective. Imagine  
Le Pen and Salvini rising to power, toying with exit. A sell-off or 
rating downgrades would only exacerbate the sense of crisis and 
could become self-reinforcing. It should be avoided.  
Why have member states retreated from issuing guarantees? 
After all, they make firm assertations that they will support the EU budget in the future to 
ensure timely debt service. In principle, a guarantee would be nothing more than a legal 
manifestation of that promise. If member states are convinced that their payment promises 
are indeed non-negotiable, underwriting the bonds more formally would not incur any 
additional cost. On the contrary, it could lower the EU’s borrowing cost and therefore save 
European taxpayer money. What is holding them back, then?  
Sovereign guarantees have 
been the instrument of choice 
since the Community Loan 
Mechanism of the 1970s. 
So far only a few investors have 
begun to question why a borrowing 
programme that will be unusually 
large will benefit from protections 
that are unusually weak. 
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One reason for their reluctance could be as mundane as accounting. Eurostat, the European 
statistics agency, decided in 2010 that member state guarantees supporting EFSF issues should 
be included in the calculation of guarantors’ debt ratios in proportion to their guarantee 
commitment (European Commission, 2011). Equalising contingent liabilities with outright debt 
seems questionable on substance, but the rule stands. Concerns that it might also apply to the 
much larger debt now going to be issued may caution member states already weary of rising 
public debt in the wake of the crisis. That concern is unwarranted. Eurostat took the EFSF-
decision based on the fact that it was effectively an empty shell without any decision-making 
power and not under the control of existing European institutions (the Eurogroup is only a 
working group of the Council). This argument cannot plausibly be made with respect to the EU 
itself.  
But if it is not the fear of the accounting treatment of guarantees, what is it that keeps member 
states clearly stepping up to the plate to support the EU’s debt with guarantees? This is a 
question that will have to be answered. If not now, then in more turbulent times ahead. The 
answer must not be appropriation risk in national parliaments. If today, at a time of high 
solidarity and collective pandemic trauma, governments were to harbour doubts that their 
national legislatures would approve large amounts of guarantees, why should investors be 
confident that appropriations to make good on the less firm promises will be reliably approved 
in the distant future?  
If no compelling answer is forthcoming, the risk of investors taking a more cautious approach 
should not be dismissed. To rely on the ECB to step into the breach is a risky assumption, unless 
one believes implausibly that QE will extend all the way to 2058, which would signal an 
existential crisis of the euro. In sum, there is no good reason why member states have so far 
shied away from guaranteeing EU bonds. It is not too late to do so to mitigate the risk of a 
confidence crisis down the road. 
Collateral. An alternative to guarantees would be to pledge collateral, for example in the form 
of government bonds. This has been the mechanism applied by the Brady Plan, which brought 
an end to the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s (Trade Association for Emerging Markets). 
Back then bank loans taken out by Latin American governments were converted into tradeable 
bonds with US-Treasuries as credit support. As in the 1980s, the EU bonds’ debt service would 
be secured by a collateral pledge, held in an escrow account. That pledge could cover all future 
debt service, in which case it would be equivalent to a guarantee. It could also be partial and 
revolving, undergirding only a certain share of the EU’s overall debt service. Defaulting on a 
bond used as collateral would clearly be a default of the member state itself. Cross-default 
holds once again, making the pledge highly credible. Pledging collateral would therefore be the 
cleanest solution, unambiguously equalising the support pledge with member states’ own full 
faith and credit obligations. In bond market parlance EU bonds would be unambiguously pari 
passu with member states’ obligations. 
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At current interest rates this issuance of government bonds used as collateral would be 
affordable, although that could change in the period up to 2058. The collateral solution would, 
however, have one obvious disadvantage compared to guarantees. They would immediately 
increase the debt of national governments one-for-one. This enhancement is therefore even 
more unlikely to be considered than the guarantee option. 
Give the EU taxation power. When releasing its recovery fund plans, the Commission itself 
proposed to give the EU several new own revenue sources independent of transfers from 
member states. Specifically, the proposal refers to a digital tax, resources from the EU’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme and a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (European 
Commission, 2020a). These fees or taxes would go to the EU budget straight away, with no 
detour through member states’ finances. Together they could fund the EU budget to an annual 
amount of approximately €20 billion (European Commission, 2020c). This is not far from the 
average €25 billion annual net amortisation between 2028 and 2058. If implemented, this could 
bolster the EU’s finances and mitigate the risks to its creditworthiness, especially if those new 
own resources receipts were to be truly additional. To the degree that they would be offset by 
lower transfers from member states’ budgets, the beneficial impact would of course be 
proportionally smaller. But even then, it would still underscore the value member states attach 
to the EU as an institution, providing a powerful signal for fiscal integration in Europe. Investors 
and rating agencies should take comfort from such a step. If member states were to agree to 
give the EU more financial autonomy now, chances are that more would follow in the decades 
to come, further propping up the credit quality of the EU bonds without dependence on 
members’ transfers.  
Unfortunately, while a final decision is still outstanding, the discussion on raising own resources 
seems to have stalled. In times of their own burgeoning deficits, member states seem wary 
about giving up on tax bases in what is effectively a zero-sum situation. A tax base is either 
attached to the Union or member states. Ultimately the member states will decide who gets 
the tax base. They should consider the Commission proposal. Strengthening the EU’s finances 
will make it financially more independent. This may provide member states with more national 
fiscal flexibility in the future, as the need for budgetary contributions will fall correspondingly. 
In a situation where the future seems further away than normal and time preference is 
especially high, the prospects for the Commission’s proposal to be adopted seem modest. 
Rejection would not help the EU’s creditworthiness. 
Remove the grant element. A radical way to improve the financial safety of EU bonds is to 
remove the grant element (currently up to €500 billion, or two-thirds of the total). According 
to media reports this modification has been propagated by the Netherlands and Austria. 
Removing the grants and converting them into loans would make the EU loans stronger: all 
would be secured by the payment obligations of borrowing member states, to whom the raised 
funds would be on-lent. Other members would only be obliged to contribute should one of the 
borrowers default on loans from the EU. But enhancing EU creditworthiness through this 
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channel would be a pyrrhic victory. It would fly in the face of political intent to display solidarity 
across societies in times of unprecedented challenges.  
With the grant genie now out of the bottle, pushing it back in could raise serious questions 
about the viability of the EU as a political project in the long term. Investors and rating agencies 
would likely react in an adverse way to such a U-turn on European integration. The risk of this 
radical ‘solution’ being adopted appears small. Most member states, led by heavyweights 
France and Germany, appear steadfast in their preference for a sizeable grant element. But 
even a drawn-out acrimonious discussion about this subject could be harmful to investor 
sentiment. It would accentuate fault-lines inside the EU that could still break open in the future. 
That is not conducive to market confidence.  
All things considered, none of the abovementioned credit-enhancement mechanisms will be 
adopted. At this point, the issuance of EU bonds should be possible at attractive rates even 
without enhancements. Investors will talk about the reassurance of the ECB being there as a 
de facto backstop. They will also take comfort from the belief that the bonds will be sought 
after by central banks across the globe as a reserve asset. But that belief is still to be tested. In 
a world with ample supply of outright government bonds, some may prefer to stick to their 
established portfolio. In any case global foreign exchange reserves have stopped growing for 
almost a decade now, effectively capping demand for reserve assets.  
Issuing such an unprecedented amount of bonds without additional safeguards carries risks. 
Comparable to driving without a seatbelt. Today, we face an open road, the sun is shining and 
driving conditions are ideal. But if you are about to embark upon a 38-year journey, 
unanticipated accidents can happen. You may yet face bad weather and unforgiving traffic. Or 
maybe you make an error of judgement yourself. Most of the time we do not really need the 
seatbelt when driving, because accidents happen so rarely. Nevertheless, we still habitually use 
seatbelts without even thinking about it, and for good reason. The EU should buckle up as well. 
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